An ineffective U.S. must revise its role in the Balkans

DAVID BRAUCHLI/NEWSMAKERS

Since the commencement of the NATO occupation of Kosovo—and it cannot reasonably be called anything else—violence against the Serbian minority has been rampant. These attacks have been intended to do more than simply revenge Yugoslav action; they have also been used to rid Kosovo of its Serbian population. These attacks, which also targeted Gypsy and Turkish minorities, have been extremely effective: 180,000 of Kosovo's pre-NATO-intervention minority population of195,000 have fled.

The most recent flurry of violence has taken place in Kosovska Mitrovica, near the Serbian border. On Wed., Feb. 2, the bombing of a United Nations (U.N.) bus left two elderly Serbs dead and initiated a storm of violence that has, as of the writing of this article, left nine dead and at least 25 wounded. In addition, several hundred Albanians living in the Serbian area have been intimidated into leaving their homes.

On Mon., Feb. 21, approximately 25,000 ethnic Albanians, waving the Albanian national flag, marched the 25 miles from the nation's capitol, Pristina, to protest what they fear will be the eventual partition of the city and of Kosovo. The general sentiment of these marchers was perhaps best described by Jeton Balaj, a 24-year-old marcher, who said, "Mitrovica cannot be partitioned because it means very much for all the people of Kosovo." Life under an Albanian-dominated government would be manifestly impossible for the Serbs of the city, which indicates that Balaj's "all the people of Kosovo" does not include any non-Albanians. Further, it seems clear that those 25,000 people were really protesting the presence of any Serbs in Kosovo, a land that has been part of Serbia for hundreds of years.

Combine the preceding information with the fact that Serbia has a refugee population of 700,000 to 900,000, the largest in Europe, and it becomes clear that the Serbs have nothing appraching a monopoly on ethnic cleansing. Rather deep-seated ethnic hatred and willingness to act on it are qualities possessed by all of the major ethnic groups of Bosnia and Kosovo.

An international occupation is unlikely to quell these violent tendencies, which is well displayed by the present situation in Bosnia. Approximately 29,000 troops remain there after a five-year occupation, and most experts agree that a new war would begin within a few days of a complete withdrawal of the international force.

The leaders of both the Serbian and Croatian minorities estimate that it will be decades before coexistence is possible. Both groups also continue to maintain armies affiliated with the nation of their ethnicity, and the actions of even the most optimistic group, the Muslims, do not bode well. The Muslims recently proposed changing the name of the national language from Serbo-Croation (the actual name) to Bosnian. Since both Serbs and Croats in Bosnia strongly associate themselves with those ethnic designations, the term Bosnian, when used without qualification, generally refers to Muslims. As a result, both Serbs and Croats quite correctly consider the proposed name change an attempt to marginalize them, as well as an affront to their respective cultures.

All of this suggests that it is time to give up the idea of ethnic conciliation in the Balkans. The attempt to create one Bosnian state with three presidents was always laughable and remains so. The ideal of one, multi-ethnic Kosovo is similarly comical. The only solution is some sort of partition. Not that such a move will be easy. In Kosovo, for instance, there exist a few mineral-rich areas along the border of Serbia proper that are by far the most valuable lands in the province and which both groups would be loathe to lose in a partition. Nor would a partition solve all of the area's problems; since the Kosovo Liberation Army, notorious for its terrorism and drug trafficking, would likely still enjoy its popularity.

Nevertheless, partition is the only solution that offers any hope of recalling the occupying troops. And withdrawal ought to be foremost in America's mind for both fiscal and personal reasons. On the financial side, the U.S. estimates that the occupation of Kosovo alone will cost about $3 billion a year. On the personal side, having thousands of Americans living in a dangerous, underdeveloped area thousands of miles from their families ought to be avoided at all costs.

U.S. disinclination to pursue such a partition has been founded primarily on a desire to prevent the "ethnic cleansers" from "winning." It's time to recognize that in an area where virtually all leaders are "ethnic cleansers," the advantage of all must necessarily also be the advantage of the "ethnic cleansers." Thus, since reconciliation has proven useless and determining partition specifics will be difficult, the initiation of negotiations for partition of both Bosnia and Kosovo ought to become the primary goal in American dealings with those areas.

Stevan Nicholas is a junior in Silliman.

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