Professor questions usefulness of strikes against Iraq

On Fri, Feb. 16, American and British forces engaged in air strikes to destroy radar installations and anti-aircraft sites near Baghdad, Iraq in order to reduce the growing danger to pilots who patrol the southern no-fly zone. While strikes of this sort having been going on for years, those on the 16th departed from previous policy by hitting targets near the Iraqi capital. The attacks were meant to show Iraqi President Saddam Hussein America's continued military presence in the Middle East. However, both the efficacy of the strikes against Hussein's regime and their role in Washington's long-term Middle Eastern policy remain unclear.

The Herald spoke with Professor of Middle Eastern History Abbas Amanat about these recent events. Amanat received his Ph.D. from Oxford University in 1981 and has written a number of books on the Middle East.

REBECCA ROSENTHAL/YH Amanat believes that strikes will only tighten Saddam Hussein's grip on Iraq

Yale Herald: How have the air strikes altered the status quo in the Middle East and the international community?

Abbas Amanat: The air strikes will strengthen Hussein's position within the Arab world by giving him greater support from the people in neighboring countries and among the Arab governments. Secondly, the strikes further divided the international alliance against Iraq. The Russians, Chinese, and French have all been vocal in their criticism of the U.S. and Britain. On those grounds, it seems the strikes have been an advantage to the Iraqi regime.

As for its political effects, the strike will frighten Iraqis but perhaps consolidate Hussein's position. If the U.S. continues with intensive bombing (a kind of Kosovo scenario), it will lead to more international criticism of the U.S., especially if it includes targets other than radar stations. I doubt any U.S. administration can afford it. A show of force such as the one we saw last week is therefore very likely to remain just that.

YH: What will Secretary of State Colin Pow-ell experience during his upcoming trip to Saudi Arabia and Egypt?

AA: The Saudis and the Egyptians will urge the U.S. to put an end to the more urgent and more disruptive Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the region. The Saudis are themselves in a politically precarious position, and Egypt has an equally wide range of problems, economic and otherwise. The rest of the region, with the exception of Jordan, is not friendly toward the U.S. Even in Jordan, a large part of the population is not supportive of the U.S. There is no doubt that Hussein is benefiting from antipathy toward the U.S. because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. YH: What do you think Hussein's goals are?

AA: He has this heroic image of himself—possibly as a second Nasser, who prevailed over a great Western power. The events of the past decade no doubt have confirmed this image in his mind. He'll try to bring about greater division in the international alliance, and he may succeed. He is very much in tune with the mentality of the Cold War era. He would like to see Russia on his side, and he will rely on his oil resources to entice the European Community. In the long run these are a series of maneuvers that will lead to the lifting of sanctions. I cannot see any major external or domestic threats to his course of policy. Even if the U.S. carries on with further air strikes, I doubt this would result in the downfall of Hussein's regime.

YH: Given the fact that he has constructed Iraq's political system around himself, has the nation of Iraq become inseparable from the person of Hussein?

AA: No. I wouldn't underestimate the level of internal opposition and popular dissatisfaction with the current Iraqi regime. Obviously, after facing a brutal and suppressive regime for such a long time, people feel very intimidated and demoralized and are forced to follow any kind of leadership. But I don't consider this genuine support for Hussein. Iraq is a country under siege because of the sanctions. Under these circumstances, people's livelihoods depend more and more on the government. So one can expect very little in terms of resistance or an independent course of action.

YH: How does Hussein reconcile his pan-Arab rhetoric with the reality of his actions, which have frequently shattered Arab unity?

AA: From Hussein's perspective, his actions are all part of a great plan for realizing his dream of a united Arab nation. For him Kuwait is just a colonial conspiracy, a nuisance to be removed from the map. This was also the case in the war with Iran—unjustified as it was, it was part of his expansionist vision for a greater Arab nation. However, this dream is largely dead. Hussein may still utilize the rhetoric—although we haven't heard much lately—but there is no substance to it. How his motives are going to be perceived by the rest of the Arab world is another question. They know that he is unpredictable and dangerous, yet they have to pay some homage to the fact that he's the voice of dissent within the Arab world and receives much sympathy from the Arab people.

YH: Can the U.S. normalize relations with Iraq while Hussein remains in power?

AA: It is very unlikely that the U.S. can come to terms with Hussein. America may have missed its chance during the Gulf War. I don't think military action against him now is the answer, at least this kind of military action. It may seem to Americans that they're putting him in his place, just enforcing sanctions and no-fly zones, but what is the long-term policy? That has not been spelled out, either by the Clinton or Bush administrations. And to do nothing but wait for a coup or assassination—leaving Iraq in the hands of fate—is not a safe course of action. The fact is that the U.S. is just submitting to the reality of the times and, in the process, only punishing the people of Iraq, who are the subject of both internal oppression and international sanctions.

Back to News...